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EMOTION IN THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGING
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM"
I am going to talk about emotion in the language of judging.

I begin with two quotations. One is a statement made by Justice
Steven G. Breyer during his confirmation hearings:
I read something that moved me a lot not very long ago. I was
reading something by Chesterton, and he was talking about one
of the Bront~s ... . He said ... you go and you look out at the
City, he said - I think he was looking at London - and he said,

you know, you see all those houses now, even at the end of the
19th century, and they look as if they are the same. And you
think all those people are out there, going to work, and they are
all the same. But, he says, what Bronte tells you is they are not
the same. Each one of those persons and each one of those
houses and each one of those families is different, and they each
have a story to tell. Each of those stories involves something
about human passion. Each of those stories involves a man, a
woman, children, families, work, lives. And you get that sense
out of the book. So sometimes, I have found literature very
helpful as a way out of the tower.1
The other quotation is from an article in The New Republic
on the occasion of the retirement of Justice Blackmun. It is
called "Sentimental Journey," and it was written by Jeffrey Rosen.2 Rosen stated:
But feeling deeply is no substitute for arguing rigorously; and
the qualities that made Blackman an admirable man ultimately
condemned him to be an ineffective Justice. By reducing so
many cases to their human dimensions and refusing to justify
Ernst Freund Professor of Law and Ethics at The University of Chicago.
Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 232-33 (1994) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings] (statement of
Stephen G. Breyer, Supreme Court Nominee).
2 Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence
of Harry
Blackmun: Criticism of Retiring United States Supreme Court Justice, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, May 2, 1994, at 13.
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his impulses with principled legal arguments, Blackmun
showed the dangers of the jurisprudence of sentiment.3

The larger thesis for which I should like to argue if I had
time here is that the language of judging should be in some respects, which we would have to specify very carefully, like the
language of the lover of literature.' By that, I mean not necessarily fine words and high style, but a language that is expressive of the kind of imagination that's capable of perceiving the
individual humanity of the people involved and their circumstances; recognizing that each has a complicated story with factors that make it not the same as anyone else's.
But, as both of my quotes recognize, that kind of imagining
is rich in emotion. The world of the Brontis is a world of human
passion. And if we think of the judge as a literary artist or a
reader of literature, we are led to wonder how far should that
language be rich in emotion. That is my focus here today.
I want to begin with a question. What is Jeffrey Rosen
really worried about when he talks about the jurisprudence of
sentiment? I think there are two quite distinct things he is worried about. One is an entirely false worry, the other more interesting. The one that's ultimately less interesting, and you can
see this throughout his article, is that Rosen appears to believe,
as I think quite a lot of people do before they start thinking
much about the structure of emotions, that emotions are something quite unthinking, opposed to reasoning in some very strong
and primitive way, and that they are mindless surges of affect.'
Simply stated, they believe that emotions do not contain or rest
upon any kind of thought.'
This seems to be a very weak position when one starts to reflect about what emotions like anger, sympathy, grief and so on
really are. It just cannot stand up. One can quickly recognize

3Id.
' See Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L.
REV. 1351, 1388 (1986) (arguing that literature is vital to judge's awareness of perspectives beyond those of author and is therefore essential to sound decision making).
5 See Rosen, supra note 2 at 13 (comparing Blackmun to Frank Murphy, "the
warmhearted New Dealer," who tended to "let his heart get the better of his head"
and describing Blackmun's "sentimental homilies" as nothing more than "impulsive
sympathy").
See id. at 14 (describing Blackmun as an "indecisive, unsophisticated craftsman, unconcerned about dressing up his humane impulses in legal reasoning").
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that emotions like that are really not at all like gusts of wind or
surges of the blood. They rest upon a certain kind of view of an
object, and they often embody very complicated beliefs about the
object. In this respect, I think what Aristotle said in the Rhetoric7 about emotions, has not been very much surpassed. He argued that to have anger, you have to have certain beliefs about
what has happened, about the seriousness of what has happened, about the deliberateness with which that damage was
inflicted, and a host of other beliefs.8
To have sympathy or compassion for someone's plight, again,
you have to believe something about the seriousness of what that
person has suffered. You have to believe that it did not come
upon them entirely through their own fault. Moreover, you have
to believe that that is a general human possibility; that you
yourself have similar possibilities. Or at least that is what has
been argued by most of the people who have written about compassion in Western philosophical traditions. So, emotions are
not just mindless; they embody thoughts. Therefore, we cannot
dismiss them from judicial reasoning and writing just by opposing them in an unreflective way to reasoning and thought.
But then the more interesting and serious worry arises, that
even if we grant that emotions have many cognitive features,
and embody forms of thought, we still have to ask which ones are
appropriate, which ones should be guides, and which ones are
good guides in public reasoning. We might start to worry, and I
think that this is Rosen's more interesting worry, that a judge
who is guided by emotion will simply let sympathy gush all over
the place in an inappropriate way, that it will lead to a disregard
of the evidence, a disregard of legal reasoning, and just a kind of
inappropriate gushy way of proceeding.9 In my conclusion, I will
comment on this as a view of Justice Blackman. I think Rosen is
very unfair in many respects. But, in any case, I think that is
the really interesting worry.
Now, in pursuing that worry, I think a very good place to
turn is to Adam Smith's Theory Of Moral Sentiments,0 which in
ed., 1959).
See id. at ch. II. 1-2.
9 See Rosen, supra note 2 at 14, 18 (lambasting Blackmun for personalizing
cases while ignoring or misinterpreting underlying constitutional issues and criticizing notion that warmhearted impulses are more important than legal reasoning).
0ADAi SMITH, THE THEORY OF MoRAL SENTmumNTs (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie, eds., Oxford University Press 1976).
7 ARISTOTELIS, ARS RmETORICA (W.D. Ross
8
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turn will bring me back to the role of the picture of the judge as a
reader and lover of literature. Now, Smith in Moral Sentiments
describes a norm of public rationality.
And the way he describes it is by imagining a certain kind of character whom he
calls the judicious or impartial spectator, who is imagined as
someone whose artificially constructed situation will be a model
of the point of view of public rationality." That is, this person
whom we construct will have all and only those thoughts, sentiments, and fantasies that are part of a publicly rational outlook
on the world. 3
Smith focuses on a central question: Which emotions will
such a figure have? And he insists that this figure will not have
all emotions, but most of the major emotions will appear somewhere in this person's reflection-only, however, in a certain
way. 4 Now, we have to then step back and say, "How is this
construction imagined?"
The impartial spectator, first of all, is a spectator. He or she
is someone not personally involved in the events that are being
witnessed, although this person cares about the participants as a
concerned friend and onlooker. So, he is not going to have such
thoughts and emotions as relate to his own personal safety and
happiness or to anything about the way in which his own personal stake in the outcome has an impact on the situation. So, in
that sense, he is without bias, and he surveys the scene before
him with a certain kind of detachment.
On the other hand, the judicious spectator is not for that
reason lacking in feeling. Among his most important moral faculties is the power of imagining vividly what it is like to be each
of the persons whose situation he imagines." Smith writes:
" See id. at 9-13 (maintaining that solely by imagination can one form conceptions regarding another's emotional state).
2See

id.

'3 See id. at 12 (characterizing compassion of spectator as his own feeling if
similarly situated, requiring spectator to utilize both reason and judgment).
'4 Id.
at 11, 21. Smith describes how the "furious behaviour of an angry man" is
likely to prejudice the spectator against the angry man, and perhaps favor his enemies. SMITH, supra note 10, at 11. Smith further emphasizes that the emotions of
the spectator will always fall short of the emotions of the direct experience. Id. at
21.
15See SMITH, supra note 10, at 12 (noting that when we place ourselves in another's situation, "passion arises in our breast from the imagination"); see also Benjamin Zipursky, Deshaney and Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1101, 1129 (1990) ("Compassion is not a simple feeling-state but a complex emo-
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[T]he spectator must, first of all, endeavour, as much as he can,
to put himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home to
himself every little circumstance of distress which can possibly
occur to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to render as
perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation upon
which his sympathy is founded. 6
Smith goes on to say that empathy is one stage, but it's not
sufficient for public rationality because often the misfortunes
that befall people damage their ability to assess their situation
correctly and to see it the right way." At the most extreme, we
can imagine a case of someone who has lost rationality through
some accident. This person may have a very painless life and
empathy might show us the pleasure of a contented child, but
Smith observes that the judicious spectator will view the calamity as a very dreadful one for precisely that reason. 8
What that shows us is that both empathetic identification
accompanied with a kind of critical external assessment are crucial in determining the degree of emotion that it is rational for
the participants in the case to have. Smith continues: "The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the
same unhappy situation, and, what is perhaps impossible, was
at the same19 time able to regard it with his present reason and
judgment.'
Smith then goes on to say that since, as he has argued previously, the major emotions such as compassion, anger and so on
are based on belief and reasoning, the spectator will be rich in
those emotions." However, there is a crucial qualification-not
all emotions are good guides.2 To be a good guide, the emotion,
tional attitude toward another, characteristically involving imaginative dwellings on
the condition of the other person ... .") (citing LAWRENCE BLUM, COMPASSION, IN
EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 507, 509 (A. Rorty ed. 1980)).
SMITH, supra note 10, at 21.

See id. at 12 (acknowledging that reason may be lost when calamities occur
and that those in such situations become "insensible" to their own misery).
" See id. at 12 (recognizing that anguish felt by humanity for one who is not
cognizant of their own misery and concluding that anguish cannot reflect suffer's
sentiment).
'9Id. at 12.
20See id. at 10. Smith observes that "whatever is the passion which arises from
any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up at
the thought of this situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator."
21 See SMITH, supra note 10, at 16-19. (explaining process by which spectator
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first of all, has to be informed by a true view of what is going on,
of the facts of the case, of their significance for all the actors in
the situation, and of any dimensions of their real significance
that may elude or be distorted in the consciousness of the actors.22

Second, the emotion has to be the emotion of a spectator, not
a participant. 2' That means not only that we have to perform
this reflective assessment of the situation to figure out whether
the participants have understood it correctly; it also means that
we have to omit that portion of the emotion that derives from a
personal interest in our own goals and projects.24 The device of
the judicious spectator is aimed above all at filtering out that
portion of anger, fear, and even compassion that focuses on the
self in its cherished projects.25
If, for example, my friend suffers an injustice, I'll become
angry on his behalf, but according to Smith, that anger lacks the
2
special vindictive intensity of anger at wrongs done to oneself. 1
Again, if my friend is grieving at a loss, I'll share the grief, but
not its disabling and blinding excess. For Smith, thinking of this
distinction helps us to think of what public actors should be
like.27 They should be passionate for the well being of others, but
they should not insert themselves and their own goals into the
picture that they responsively contemplate.
Throughout the discussion, Smith uses literary readership
as well as spectatorship at dramas to illustrate the stance and
the emotions of this judicious spectator. 8 Smith, thus, attaches
considerable import to literature as a source of moral guidance.29
determines whether passions of person principally concerned are unjust, improper,
or unsuitable to original situation).
22 See id. at 21 (requiring spectator to completely put himself in situation of sufferer).
2See
id. at 21-22. Since the spectators think of their own safety and are not
real sufferers, this hinders them from reaching that degree of passion which naturally animates the participant. Id.
24 See id. at 22 (affirming importance of spectator to view situation in his more
"candid and impartial light").
25 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 10 at 17-18 (discussing conflicting range of emo-

tions felt by spectator upon witnessing stranger's grief for loss of his father).
28 See id. at 32 (observing that characters in tragedies and
romances receive
sympathy, affection, and indignation from readers).
29 In his work, Smith analyzes the empathy felt for classical literary figures. See
id. at 32-33.
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Furthermore, it seems that Smith derives the importance of literary readership from the fact that readership is in effect an artificial construction of judicious spectatorship that is perhaps
more familiar to us than this artificial construct. So, it leads us
in a pleasing and natural way into understanding the attitude
that befits a good citizen and judge.
As we read, we are immersed and intensely concerned for
the participants; and we see the participants, as Breyer points
out, as individuals with their own stories to tell. ° But we do not
know where we are in the situation before us. We care about the
individual characters and to some extent, we identify with them.
But we lack the special and often confused intensity of emotion
that would derive from thinking that it's really our own life
that's at issue.
Now, what I think Smith suggests, and I find this a very
promising suggestion that would have to be developed much further than I can here, is that this really is a good way of thinking
about how emotion can enter into judicial thought and judicial
writing; that we want emotion that is tethered to the evidence,
that has been carefully filtered for bias, that's informed by legal
reasoning of the best sort. But that if we do get that, there is absolutely no reason why emotion shouldn't be an important part of
judicial thought and writing.3 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that the public imagination could be complete without that.
I do think that there might be at least an argument for saying that some of the ways in which Justice Blackman wrote
emotionally, for example, the famous exclamation "poor Joshua"32
30

See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 232-33 (describing Bronte's

awareness of diversity among seemingly homogenous population of London).
3'See Zipursky, supra note 15, at 1135 (contending that compassionate stance is
better suited to thorough legal interpretation than dispassionate one); Samuel H.
Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 655, 655-56 (1989) ("This insistence upon the injustice of all emotion stems from a misconception of emotion and its influence upon criminal punishment.").
32 Deshaney v. Winnebago City Social Serv. Dep't., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Deshaney, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that
Wisconsin's social service department violated the plaintiffs due process right to
liberty by failing to intervene and prevent severe child abuse. Id. at 203. Blackmun
responded:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed
him in a dangerous predicament .... It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor
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and so on," might give rise to the reading-maybe it would be
misreading, but certainly could give rise to the reading that this
was an untethered kind of personal explosion of sentiment. And
I think if one were to find fault with him along those lines, that
would be the way to argue.
Sympathetic emotion that is tethered to the evidence and
free from reference to one's own personal goals and situation is
not only acceptable, but actually essential to public judgment.
But it is that sort of emotion that literary works construct in
their readers. And that, I think, means that literary readership
is what Smith thinks it is: an artificial construction of some crucial elements in the norm of public rationality and also of judicial
language.

about "liberty and justice for all"-that this child, Joshua Deshaney, now is
assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.
Id. at 213.
3See,
e.g., Penda D. Hair, Justice Blackmun and Racial Justice, 104A YALE L.
J. 7, 9-12 (1994) (explaining Blackmun's recurring sensitivity to reality, victims of
discrimination, and impact Court's opinions have on employers). Justice Blackmun
wrote: "[M]y record and the opinions that I have written ... will show, particularly
... in the treatment of little people, what I hope is a sensitivity to their problems."
Id. at 25.

